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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceeding in the trial court:
1.

John William Cox, Petitioner/Appellee, represented by Laura M.

Rasmussen, attorney at law of Dan Wilson & Associates and F. Kim Walpole of Law
Offices of Vlahos & Walpole.
2.

Brenda Lyn Krammer, formerly known as Cox, Respondent/Appellant,

represented by George M. Handy and Raymond B. Rounds, attorneys at Law.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court err in determining that Petitioner's Motion to Modify

Custody did have serious merit and was brought in good faith and, therefore, was justified
in not awarding Respondent's attorney's fees, pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated §303-5(5)?
2.

Did the Trial Court err in ordering Respondent to pay one-half of the costs

of the home evaluation?
APPLICABLE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(5):
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action if the
court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended
against in good faith.
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56:
Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad faith - Exceptions.
(1) In civil action, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection
(2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) Finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniousity in the
action before the court; or
Brief of Appellee
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(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
Rule 6-401(4), Code of Judicial Administration - Domestic Relations
Commissioners:
(4) Objections. With the exception of pre-trial orders, the
commissioner's recommendation is the order of the court until modified by the
court. Any party objection to the recommended order shall file a written objection
to the recommendation with the clerk of the court and serve copies on the
commissioner's office and opposing counsel. Objections shall be filed within ten
days after the date of the subsequent written recommendation made by the
commissioner. Objections shall be to specific recommendations and shall set forth
reasons for each objection.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case. This case involves Petitioner's Motion to Modify the
child custody of the parties' minor child from "joint custody" of Brittany, with Respondent
being designated the custodial parent and Petitioner standard visitation rights, to an award
of custody of Brittany to Petitioner as detailed and set forth in Petitioner's Motion to
Modify Custody, due to a substantial and material change of circumstances in
Respondent's lifestyle, as being in the best interests of Brittany.
B. Course of Proceedings. Petitioner and Respondent were husband and wife,
with their daughter, Brittany, born on the 18th day of June, 1996. Petitioner filed a
divorce action against Respondent and the matter was heard as an uncontested default
divorce on the 12th day of January, 1999. The Decree of Divorce was signed by the
Brief of Appellee
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Honorable Roger S. Dutson on the 9 day of February, 1999. The Decree of Divorce
provided, among other things, that "the parties were awarded joint custody of Brittany,
with Respondent, being designated the custodial parent and Petitioner awarded standard
visitation rights, as outlined in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-33, et. seq., as amended."
On the 23rd of June, 2000, Petitioner filed his Motion to Modify Custody and plead
therein that "since the entry of the Divorce Decree on February 9, 1999, the circumstances
have materially changed, as set forth in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
Affidavits and other evidence, which is attached as Exhibits to the Memorandum."
Several Motions were filed by the parties, through their respective attorneys, prior
to the trial date of April 8, 2002, including a Motion in Limine filed by Petitioner to
include evidence of Respondent's current husband's criminal arrest, conviction, and/or
court documents relating thereto, which Motion was denied as to any evidence or
testimony relating to the matter entitled "State of Utah, Plaintiff, vs. Jeremy Wade
Krammer, Defendant, Case No. 961700432. Respondent's filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that Petitioner
had failed to meet the test of a substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient
to review a modification of the current custody situation, which was denied by the trial
court. Neither of these Motions were appealed.

Brief of Appellee
rase No. 20020696 CA

4

Trial was commenced on the 8th day of April, 2002. The trial court issued its
Memorandum Decision on the 10th day of June, 2002 (See Exhibit "A" to Respondent's
Addendum) and the trial court ultimately signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
(See Exhibit "B" to Respondent's Addendum) and Judgment (See Exhibit "C" to
Respondent's Addendum) on the 12th day of July, 2002, which were entered on the 19th
day of July, 2002.
C. Disposition in the Trial Court: Judgment was entered in favor of Respondent,
the Court holding, among other things, "that there is not a material change in
circumstances to justify a change in custody" and that "[E]ach party will pay their own
attorney fees. [T]he petition of John Cox did have serious merit and was brought in good
faith." (See page 7 of 9 of the trial court's Memorandum Decision, in particular,
paragraphs 1 and 9, attached as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.)
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review:
1.

The trial court found and ruled that "[E]ach party will pay their own attorney

fees. The petition of John Cox did have serious merit and was brought in good faith.
See 30-3-5(5), U.C.A." See page 7 of 9, paragraph 9 of trial Judge's Memorandum
Decision, attached as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.
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2.

The trial court found and ruled that [T]he Court concludes, however, that

Brenda Krammer should pay one-half of the cost incurred to have Phil Johnson conduct
the custody evaluation in this case." See page 7 of 9, paragraph 8 of trial Judge's
Memorandum Decision, attached as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court did not commit error in determining that Petitioner's Motion

to Modify the Decree of Divorce for a change of custody did have serious merit and was
brought in good faith and the Trial court was justified in denying Respondent's request for
an award of attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(5) as,
given the trial court's discretion in the matter, which was not abused, the trial, and the
detailed Findings and Conclusions of the court, the Petitioner's Motion had serious merit
and was brought in good faith.
2.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its Finding and Order

that the parties share in the costs of the custody evaluation as the court found that
Petitioner's Motion had serious merit and was brought in good faith, having found that
even with the denial of Petitioner's requested change in custody, the trial Court concluded,
that Respondent should share in the costs in changing the Commissioner's Pre-Trial
Order, as it was not binding on the Trial court.
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ARGUMENTS
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO MODIFY THE CUSTODY AWARD DID HAVE SERIOUS MERIT AND
WAS BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH AND IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S REQUEST
FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED SECTION 30-3-5(5).
The Appellant Courts accord the Trial Court's Findings great deference and will not
disturb those findings unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence and will set
aside factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756
P.2d 95, at 98 (Utah App. 1988). In Anderson, after reviewing the trial court's Findings,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as its Findings were supported
by ample evidence as they are here in this immediate case.
Respondent in its Brief refers this court to the two-part procedure for obtaining a
change of custody post divorce through a requested modification of the Decree by
detailing the standard as set forth in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d (Utah 1982), Kramer v.
Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987), as amply cited and detailed in Respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed, heard and denied with the trial court. The trial court found
sufficient basis in its denial of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and as did the
Domestic Relations Commissioner, in his Pretrial Order to submit the question of a change
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of custody of the minor child of the parties to an evidentiary hearing before the trial judge,
which was done. Neither party appealed the denial of Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Also, Petitioner, in his Motion and Memorandum for Change of Custody,
detailed the same cases and standards for a post divorce change of custody.
The Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(5) does specifically provide that, if a Petition
for Modification of child custody is denied, that the court shall order the Petitioner to pay a
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party, if and only if, the court makes two
separate findings. Firstly, the trial court must find that the Petition to Modify the custody
is without merit and secondly, the trial court must find that the Petition was not asserted in
good faith. If the trial court does not make a finding in favor of the non-petitioning party
on both requirements, then the trial court does not award the non-petitioning party
attorney's fees.
There are no Utah cases directly interpreting this statute, but by analogy, although
this statute is more fact specific to change in custody cases, the cases interpreting Utah
Code Annotated §78-27-56, can be applied with essentially the same result and application
as set forth below, in denying Respondent's request for attorney's fees pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §30-3-5(5), based on the trial court's specific finding that Petitioner's
Motion did have serious merit and was brought in good faith.
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This court found in Utah Dep yt of Social Servs. V. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) that an award of attorney's fees premised on a finding of bad faith is, to an
extent, a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate deference is owed to
the trial judge who actually presided over the proceeding and has first-hand familiarity
with the litigation.
This court later found in Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), that
the "without merit" determination is a question of law, and therefore, the appellate court
will review it for correctness, but that a finding of bad faith is a question of fact and is
reviewed by the appellate court under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
As cited by Respondent, the Utah Supreme Court case of Watkiss & Campbell v.
Foa & Son, 808 P.2D 1061 (Utah 1991), held that Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56,
clearly states that the trial court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party only if it
determines (1) that the action is without merit and (2) that the action was brought in bad
faith. If the court finds both elements of the statute, then it has no discretion and must
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. This is supported by Respondent's
case of Hermes Associs. V. Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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In the immediate case at hand, the trial court clearly found that Petitioner's Motion
to Modify had serious merit and was brought in good faith and denied an award of
attorney's fees as it must with no finding of lack of merit or bad faith.
As cited by Respondent in Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 21 P.3d
235 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), Respondent in this case has the obligation of marshaling the
evidence regarding bad faith in Petitioner's filing and bringing of his Motion. A review
of the record will show that Petitioner filed a detailed Motion and Memorandum for
change of Custody, the matter was pre tried before the Commissioner and in the Pretrial
Order the Commissioner ruled "[T]hat Petitioner has met the requirements to re-open the
issue of custody." Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to have Petitioner's
requested Motion for change of custody dismissed, which Motion was denied, after
Petitioner's Motion to bring in criminal activity of Respondent's husband was denied by
the trial court. The trial court then found or ruled that Petitioner's Motion did have
"serious merit and was brought in good faith." and specifically cited the parties and
their respective attorneys to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(5). (Emphasis added).
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court, in Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414
(Utah 1989), found that this statute does not require written findings on the bad faith issue.
If a court finds bad faith, but in its discretion limits or awards no attorney's fees, then
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Section 2(b) does, however, require written findings. This ruling was clarified by Jeschke
v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), wherein it held, in considering Cady v.
Johnson, 671 P.2D 149 (Utah 1983), Arnica Mut Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) and Watkiss & Campbell, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), (all of which were
cited by Respondent), that "[AJfter this case was submitted to us, the supreme court
decided Watkiss & Campbell v. v. Foa & Son, (cites omitted),

that the supreme court

quoted Schettler favorably: 'the trial court must make specific findings with regard to each
element of the statute.' Id. At 24. Therefore it appears that in future cases where
attorney's fees are awarded pursuant to the statute, specific findings are required."
Under Jeschke, the trial court is now required to make written findings if the court
finds bad faith and attorneys fees are awarded not where there is not a finding of bad faith.
This is further clarified in the case cited by Respondent of Wardley Better Homes and
Gardens v. Cannon, 21 P.3d 235 (Utah App. Ct. 2001). A careful review of Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-27-56, reveals two subsections. The first subparagraph deals with
the trial court, awarding, in civil action, reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if
the court determines that the action was without merit and not brought in good faith, then
its delineates an exception to an award of attorney's fees, under its subsection, if not merit
and bad faith are found by the trial court. Subsection (2) states that the trial court, in its
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discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party, if bad faith and no merit were
found in its prosecution or defense of a case, if the party has filed an affidavit of
impecuniousity in the action or if the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding
fees under Subsection 1.
In the immediate case at hand, the trial court never reaches subparagraph 2 because
there was a holding or finding of serious merit and that the matter was not brought in bad
faith.

There is not exception to the award of attorney's fees to even consider under

subparagraph 2, because the trial court never gets there. Wardley does not change the
Jeschke holding which clarifies Canyon. There is still no requirement of the entry of
specific Findings on the issue of the court denying an award of attorney's fees on a basis
that Petitioner brought this action in good faith. Regardless, the court held that the action
had serious merit and was brought in good faith.
Petitioner's Motion was not "frivolous" or of "little weight of importance in law or
in fact" or "clearly [lack a] legal basis for recovery"... Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment was denied and Petitioner allowed to proceed with his Motion and even after six
days of trial and twenty-eight witnesses, the trial court, in his discretion held that
Petitioner's Motion to Modify Custody was brought with serious merit and in good faith,
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such that the denial was not clearly erroneous and the Order should stand in denying
Respondent her attorney's fees.
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING RESPONDENT TO PAY
ONE-HALF OF THE COSTS OF THE CUSTODY EVALUATION BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE RECEIVED AND EVEN WITH THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO MODIFY CUSTODY.
The Appellant Court accords the Trial Court's Findings great deference and will not
disturb those Findings unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence and will set
aside factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756
P.2d 95, at 98 (Utah App. 1988), as cited by Respondent. In Anderson, the Court of
Appeals, found, after reviewing the Findings of the trial Judge, that the trial court's
Findings were supported by ample evidence and affirmed the Trial Judge's decision, as it
should here.
In this case, Judge Ernie Jones, the Presiding Trial Judge, found that even though,
based on the evidence presented, (only after detailing in his Memorandum Decision, those
Findings of Fact that he arrived at, after six days of trial and twenty (28) witnesses), there
is not a material change in circumstances to justify a change in custody, the "Court
concludes, however, that Brenda Krammer should pay one-half of the cost incurred to
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have Phil Johnson conduct the custody evaluation in this case." See page 7 of 9,
paragraph 8 of Exhibit "A" of Respondent's Brief.
Respondent has misinterpreted Rule 6-401 of the Rules of Judicial Administration,
as to the finality of Recommended Pretrial Orders of the Domestic Relations
Commissioner. The Rule reads, in particular, subparagraph 4 that "[W]ith the exception
of Pre-Trial Orders, the commissioner's recommendation is the order of the court until
modified by the court. All other Orders of the Commissioner can be objected to within
ten (10) days of the hearing and reviewed de novo by the assigned District Court Judge.
Subsection (5) of the Rule entitled Judicial Review, states: "Cases not resolved at
the settlement or pretrial conference shall be set for trial on all issues not resolved

"

The Commissioner in his Pretrial Order stated that "Petitioner has met the
requirements to re-open the issue of custody" and "[Pjrior to scheduling a trial date, the
Court orders a home evaluation be conducted." Petitioner was ordered to pay the costs of
the home evaluation, but the "[T]rial is to be continued until the home evaluation is
completed, at which time counsel shall request that the matter be re-set." See Pre-Trial
Order, page 2, attached as Exhibit "E" to Respondent's Brief.
Neither this case nor the matter of the custody evaluation and its costs were
resolved at the Pretrial Conference, which resulted in the issuance of the Pre-Trial Order.
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The custody evaluation was completed, Petitioner paid for the costs and then the matter
went to trial. Petitioner did not file an Objection, because the Rule does not require nor
even allow for an Objection to be filed to a Pretrial Order. A Pretrial Order in a Domestic
case heard before a Domestic Relations Commissioner is issued preparing the parties for
submission of the issues not settled to the trial court.

One of the issues of Petitioners'

request for a change in custody was the costs of the custody evaluation.

The Pre-Trial

Order, as approved by Respondent's Attorney, does not indicate that the issue of the costs
of the Custody Evaluation was settled or resolved.
Rule 6-401 (2) entitled Authority of court commissioner, in particular, subparagraph
(K) states as follows:
(K) Conduct pretrial conferences with the parties and their counsel on all
domestic relations matters unless otherwise ordered by the presiding judge. The
commissioner shall make recommendations on all issues under consideration at the
pretrial and submit those recommendations to the district court.
In the immediate case, the Commissioner submitted a recommendation under the
Pretrial Order that Petitioner the parties do a home evaluation and that Petitioner pay the
costs of the home evaluation. This is a Pretrial Order and is not to be objected to but is a
recommendation of the court as to those issues in the Order to be considered at the time of
trial by the presiding judge. The presiding judge can consider the recommendations of the
Commissioner as set forth in the Pretrial Order, but the presiding or trial judge makes the
Brief of Appellee
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final order in cases not resolved at the Pretrial Conference before the Commissioner. If
the parties had agreed to who would pay the costs of the home evaluation at the time of the
Pretrial and if that agreement was reflected in the Pretrial Order, than Petitioner concedes
that it would be an issue that was resolved at the Pretrial Conference and not certified to
the trial judge, but that is not the case here.
Again, the trial or presiding Judge, after six days of sworn testimony and twentyeight (28) witnesses, in his discretion, concluded that even though Petitioner did not show
a material change in circumstances to justify a change in custody, "that Brenda Krammer
should pay one-half of the cost incurred to have Phil Johnson conduct the custody
evaluation in this case." This Order should be followed as a settlement of the issue of
payment of the court ordered custody evaluation conducted by the parties.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is sufficiently supported by the evidence of the case and
his findings and there has been no abuse of his discretion nor are the Findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence nor erroneous, such that his ruling should be affirmed
and no attorneys fees nor costs awarded and each of the parties should pay one-half of the
custody evaluation costs already paid by Petitioner to Mr. Phil Johnson.
DATED this X ^ d a y of December, 2002.
LAW OFFICES OF VLAHOS & WALPOLE

X. ' /^w\
F. KIM WALPOLE
Attorney for Petitioner

Original Signature
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, to George E. Handy and Raymond B. Rounds,
attorneys for Respondent/Appellant, at 2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102, Ogden,
Utah 84401, this %) day of December, 2002.
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